‘Poor construction and lack of scrutiny caused Scottish schools defects’ | Architects Journal

14 February 2017

The following article ‘Poor construction and lack of scrutiny caused Scottish schools defects’ in the Architects Journal from 10 January 2017 explores recent high-profile schools failures in Scotland.  It highlights the problems where private developers employ private certifiers even when there is a comprehensive local authority building control system in place.  Poor build-quality, lack of independent inspection and consequent serious defects have parallels to the Irish privatised system of ‘reinforced self-certification”


The independent investigation, headed by Northern Irish architect and construction expert John Cole, was launched to find out what led to defective walls being built at 10 primary schools, five secondaries and two additional support needs schools desgined by Holmes Architects and 3DReid Architects.

The problem across the school portfolio, which was constructed under a public-private partnership arrangement with Edinburgh Schools Partnership (ESP), came to light after nine tonnes of masonry fell at Oxgangs Primary School during a storm in January 2016.

Wall ties were found to be missing at all 17 schools, and contractors had to carry out remediation work, requiring the relocation of around 8,400 pupils.

Speaking in front of City of Edinburgh Council’s headquarters, Cole said: ‘The primary cause is poor-quality construction by a brick layer and the lack of his boss to check what he was doing [and a lack of supervision by the contractor].

’My personal recommendation would be to have more independent scrutiny [on behalf of the client]. That might mean a clerk of works or resident architect. If I was a client I would want my own independent scrutiny; not just to be reliant on the contractors’ [reports]’.

The schools were built between 2002 and 2005 by a consortium formed by Amey and Miller Construction.

One of the issues highlighted in the report was how the inner blockwork leaf was built before construction started on the outer brick layer, meaning brick ties could not be built in later.

Architectural practice the Holmes Partnership had also pointed out the issues with wall coursing, but a written statement from the firm had been ignored.

Cole’s report, while finding that there had been a ‘lack of properly resourced and structured scrutiny’ under the public-private partnership contract, did not directly blame this for the wall collapse.

‘Aspects of the way in which the PPP methodology was implemented on these projects did increase the risk of poor quality design and construction,’ it said. ‘In this regard, however, the approach adopted on the Edinburgh scheme was quite typical of that adopted generally at the time.’

It added: ‘[The] method of financing the project, per se, did not negatively influence the quality of construction in the Edinburgh schools. There is no reason why properly managed privately financed public sector buildings should not be capable of delivering buildings constructed to a very high standard, if best practice approaches to ensuring the quality of design and construction are properly incorporated.’

This statement was challenged by Glasgow architect Alan Dunlop, who recently appeared in the BBC Scotland documentary How Safe is My School? which investigated the school defects.

He said: ‘The conclusion reached that the PFI contract is not to blame and that the wall failure at Oxgangs Primary and potentially 16 other schools in Edinburgh was primarily a construction fault is bizarre and would not be my view.

I’m sure Edinburgh will be happy with this conclusion, but the PFI contract is for me at the root of the issue. Private finance for public projects seeks to maximise profit for the successful contractor by driving down tenders for subcontractors to the bare minimum while fast tracking the build programme; by lowering specification and design quality and fees for architects and other professional services.’

He added: ‘The contractor is the design team’s client, not the building user, and the subcontractor has no real incentive to complete the work to a high standard when pushed heavily for time and limited return. It is no wonder when buildings constructed under such contract conditions are found not to be fit for purpose.’

And, speaking to the BBC, the  general secretary of the Educational Institute of Scotland, Larry Flanagan, said: “The legacy of the PPP/PFI funding model is too many inferior buildings, for which we will all be paying a vastly inflated price for decades to come.”

Responding to the report, City of Edinburgh Council’s chief executive Andrew Kerr said: ‘The report pulls no punches and makes clear what went wrong, the reasons for it and where responsibility lay.

‘Clearly there are lessons for the council, and I will now be drawing up an action plan to take our recommendations forward to ensure everyone can have confidence in the safety of all of our buildings.

‘The council, our public and private sector partners both in Scotland and across the United Kingdom, need to take on board the issues raised and address the concerns highlighted in the report as they have far-reaching implications for the construction industry.’

Conclusions – summary

The problems they have had to face were fundamentally the result of poor quality construction and poor quality supervision of construction, which in slightly different circumstances, could have resulted in the injury or loss of the lives of school children.

This was not the result of the isolated incompetence of a rogue sub-contractor or bricklaying squad.

What is also significant about the Edinburgh situation is that highly professional and competent teams of structural engineers were unable to identify, through detailed visual inspections, the existence of serious defects in the construction of the walls they examined. This point is worthy of wider consideration by those who may have relied on visual inspections as a form of assurance that the underlying construction of walls are sound. Any such inadequacies in the construction of masonry panels must, therefore, be detected prior to walls being closed-up or there is no easy practical way of ensuring they have been built properly. This requires effective quality assurance and scrutiny during construction.

It is incumbent upon the construction industry to develop and promulgate best practice methods that can be relied upon to provide the necessary level of assurance in relation to those areas of construction that become quickly closed up to inspection, the failure of which could impact on the safety of the users of buildings.

It is also clear that clients, particularly public sector clients with statutory duties in relation to the communities they serve, cannot simply delegate away from themselves the responsibility of putting in place an appropriate level of informed, independent scrutiny to ensure the safety of the public buildings they procure. By independent scrutiny the inquiry is referring to inspection by individuals or organisations appointed by or directly employed by the client, who are independent of the project company or contractor undertaking the project.

Recent changes to models of procurement of public building, driven by a desire for greater efficiency, and an unachievable desire to transfer all risk away from the client, have unfortunately not appreciated the need to build into these models the essential provision of an appropriate level of independent scrutiny.

Frequently clients under such arrangements have limited direct access to the architects and engineers who design their projects or to any reports they may produce other than through the contractor. Not only does this inevitably impact on the overall design quality achieved, but with these changes the presence of architects and engineers on site has reduced. Increasingly, clerks of works and resident engineers are also not being employed to assist in the protection of the quality of construction

A number of witnesses to the inquiry identified a desire to reduce the cost of fees as a major factor in deciding the level of provision of effective inspection of construction, rather than a serious assessment of the risks of not providing for adequate independent scrutiny.

Other posts of interest:

School Building Programme : Are our children safe?

What are the priorities for School Design? | Michael Tweed RIBA MRIAI

Defective “Celtic Tiger” projects : The Cubes | Look Back 17

Defective schools | Are our children safe?

Fire-fighting | Rush and Lusk School

First Priory Hall, then Longboat Quay…now schools | Irish Examiner

Additional Engineers’ fees for school projects | SI.9

SI.9 causing major delays to school projects

RIAI: time needed for schools- BC(A)R SI.9

2 thoughts on “‘Poor construction and lack of scrutiny caused Scottish schools defects’ | Architects Journal

  1. Michael O'Neill

    Reply to
    ‘Poor construction and lack of scrutiny caused Scottish schools defects’ | Architects Journal
    http://www.bregsforum.com/2017/02/14/poor-construction-and-lack-of-scrutiny-caused-scottish-schools-defects-architects-journal/

    The third-last paragraph states: –

    “Recent changes to models of procurement of public building, driven by a desire for greater efficiency, and an unachievable desire to transfer all risk away from the client, have unfortunately not appreciated the need to build into these models the essential provision of an appropriate level of independent scrutiny.”

    I believe this is the essence of it – where once again project manager types with little or no skin in the game have influenced the form of contract to the great detriment of the quality of the built work.

    Does this not parallel Ireland where the Myth of the GCCC Contract was promulgated, similarly seeking to transfer risk and create cost certainty and – at the same time – trying to achieve a “good” price.

    Playing the GCCC game to get a win as a contractor could only happen if the market was buoyant to such a degree that contractors could walk away from a bid if there was not enough ‘fat’ in the price to allow for NO variations and a very limited increase due to cost of building materials

    How could such a one sided contract give good results when the Financial Crash and the subsequent Era Austerity all of Europe is STILL suffering under means that bottom of the barrel pricing was the norm?

    In an industry where the game played was to price low and seeking variations during the work, most people did not understand what they were getting into.

    With each project failing to cover costs builders were going from one project to the next begging Peter to pay Paul until they eventually crashed.

    Thus according to several newspaper reports it appears that the GCCC contracts have littered Ireland with unfinished projects procured by the Government

    Of course this is not down to just the price but the draconian and/or unusual measures in the contracts themselves – which appear to have been written after sharing the cup of tea with the person who wrote BC(A)R.

    I offer this discussion found on a quick search so that people do not only focus on price vs workmanship but understand that the root cause of a job going wrong can sometimes stem from unfair treatment under the contract

    http://www.tomwren.ie/CPD.pdf

    What I cannot offer, and this I find very odd, is any supporting URL showing where a builder went bust or disappeared on a Public Works Contract and I am fairly certain these were post-GCCC. I think schools and clinics were mainly affected

    I can remember seeing news reports about this but for some reason I cannot find an URL

    If anyone can assist I would be obliged

    Reply

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